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THE MARYLAND RULES - A TIME FOR OVERHAUL
Paul V. Niemeyert
The Maryland Court of Appeals Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure has for some time been
considering an extensive revision of the Maryland Rules of
Procedure. This Article examines the shortcomings of the
current rules, and suggests that the Committee has dramatic
reorganization and revision under consideration.
Satisfaction with rules of procedure emerges when the'resolution
of judicial disputes is just, prompt, and inexpensively obtained.
Rules, accordingly, should prescribe procedures that are both simple
to understand and apply, that resolve both procedural disputes as
well as the objects of the litigation with speed and economy, and
that effect a just result. Rules must become the facilitators rather
than the objects of litigation.
More frequently, the Maryland Rules of Procedure now fail
against these standards. The Rules have become a bulging
collection, developed piecemeal over many years and scattered
throughout several titles in three thick volumes of the Annotated
Code of Maryland.' Every year, and sometimes more often, new rules
are adopted and changes are made. These changes are usually
mandated either by demands of the General Assembly or by
decisions of the courts.
For example, when attachment on original process, as practiced
for years in this state and others, was held to be unconstitutional, an
entire rework of the rule was required on short notice.2 When the
procedures for the establishment and enforcement of mechanic's
t A.B., 1962, Kenyon College; J.D., 1966, University of Notre Dame; Partner, Piper
& Marbury, Baltimore, Maryland; Member, Maryland Court of Appeals Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure; Member of the Maryland Bar.
1. MD. ANN. CODE, VOLS. 9A, 9B, 9C (1977).
2. See Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574, 579 (D. Md. 1973). The court held that
Maryland procedure which permitted attachment in actions ex contractu for
liquidated damages after two summonses had been returned non est and which
attached a debtor's property before notice and an opportunity to be heard was
not an extraordinary situation under Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and
therefore was unconstitutional on fourteenth amendment procedural due process
grounds. The amended procedures are now contained in MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§3-302 to -304 (1974 & Supp. 1979) and Md. Rules G40-G61.
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liens, which had been practiced in Maryland since colonial times,
was held unconstitutional in 1976, a crash rewrite followed. 3
Similarly, new rules on expungement had to be developed when
legislation provided for the expungement of criminal records. 4 After
the General Assembly enacted legislation imposing capital punish-
ment within the permissible guidelines of the Supreme Court, new
rules of procedure had to be developed setting forth detailed
guidelines.5 On another occasion, when the ever expanding caseload
in the appellate courts mandated that the legislature diversify the
jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the rules
for appellate procedure had to be conformed. 6 Another round of
changes was prompted when the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that the right of removal in civil cases guaranteed under the
Maryland Constitution was invalid under the Federal Constitution.7
The examples continue, but these few are sufficient to convey the
image of a system of rules which have become a patchwork.
In addition to mandated changes, judges, lawyers, and profes-
sors frequently submit proposals to the Standing Rules Committee
for consideration. These proposals are often indisputably meritor-
ious, and many result in changes for improvement. 8
The combination of required changes and the ever present
limitation of time within which to effect them has resulted in a
massively disjointed quilt of rules. Consequently, Maryland judges
and lawyers are now working under strain with a body of rules that
3. See Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 33, 353 A.2d 222,
233 (1976). The mechanics lien procedure as proscribed by MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. §§9-101 to -111 (Supp. 1975) and Md. Rules BG70-BG76 was held to
violate article 23 of the Maryland Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution on procedural- due process grounds.
4. Md. Rules EX1 to EX1l were promulgated pursuant to the enactment of MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§735-741 (1976).
5. Md. Rules 772A and 898 were promulgated pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 412-414 (Supp. 1978).
6. See, e.g., Md. Rules 1017 to 1021, 1028, 1065, 1075, 1078.
7. The portion of MD. CONST. art. IV, §8 that guarantees removal of causes was
held unconstitutional in Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 82, 344 A.2d 422, 439
(1975). The court found that because the Maryland constitutional provision
deprived Baltimore City litigants of the equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
those portions of MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8 applicable to automatic removal of civil
actions were unenforceable.
The General Assembly tried to rectify the impairment through Act of May 4,
1976, ch. 454, 1976 Md. Laws 1190 (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§6-204 (Supp. 1979)). The provision was held unconstitutional, however, in
Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 652, 366 A.2d 211, 232 (1976), because it
conflicted with MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8. In the meantime Md. Rule 542 had to
parallel these changes.
8. All suggestions for rules changes are considered and referred to subcommittees
of the Standing Rules Committee for report to the entire Committee. Only upon
the recommendation of the entire Committee is the change formally presented to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland for promulgation.
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has developed organizational problems, gaps, conflicts, and ambi-
guities. These problems only serve to aggravate the inherent
weaknesses in the procedural process.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
Organizational deficiencies, while perhaps the most easily
corrected, are also the most obvious. For example, consider the rules
that govern the conduct of attorneys. Rules for admission to the bar
are contained separately in volume 9A of the Maryland Code, along
with the United State Constitution, the Maryland Constitution, the
Maryland District Rules, and the Executive Orders of the Governor.
Volume 9B, on the other hand, contains rules for admission in
particular matters.9 The conduct of an attorney at the bar is
governed by an appendix to volume 9C and by miscellaneous rules
contained in chapters 1200 and 300.10 The right to have an attorney's
accounts audited is buried in the disciplinary rules, even though an
audit could be unrelated to disciplinary action." Procedures for
disbarment are classified as a special procedure in chapter 1100.12
Claims against the Client's Security Trust Fund for defaulting
attorneys are contained in chapter 1200.13 All of these rules address
an attorney's entrance to, conduct at, or departure from the bar. Yet
why are they not contained in one location and in a logical order?
Another more obvious example of deficient organization is
provided by the arrangement of chapters in the basic rule books,
volumes 9B and 9C of the Code. Chapters 100 through 700 deal with
procedures in the circuit courts. Chapter 800, the next chapter, deals
with procedure in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, but chapter 900
(juvenile procedures) returns to the trial level. Chapter 1000 again
addresses appellate procedures (the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland), and chapter 1100 (special proceedings) reverts to the
circuit courts, with the exception of the BV Rules, which conceptu-
ally are rules for procedure in the court of appeals as a forum of
original jurisdiction.' 4 Chapter 1200 apparently deals with all courts
(although this is ambiguous),' 5 and finally, chapter 1300 governs
9. Md. Rule 302.
10. The Code of Professional Responsibility is contained in Appendix F, and is
incorporated by reference into Md. Rule 1230. Additionally, Md. Rule 1220
(Proscribed Activities - Gratuities, etc.), Md. Rule 1221 (Attorneys and other
Officers not to become Sureties), and Md. Rule 302(b) (Effect of Signature -
Certificate) proscribe the conduct of attorneys.
11. Md. Rule BV18.
12. Md. Rules BV1-BV18.
13. Md. Rule 1228(i).
14. Md. Rule BV9(b). See also Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 516, 307 A.2d 677,
680 (1973).
15. Although Chapter 1200 of the Maryland Rules deals with "Court Administra-
tion," it is not clear whether the District Court is included. See Md. Rule 1(a)(7)
that provides: "The Rules in Chapter 1200 (Court Administration) apply
19791
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appeals from the District Court to the circuit courts. As mentioned
previously the District Court rules are contained in a separate
section of volume 9A.16 The logic of this order is perceived only
through historical analysis, which demonstrates that chapters were
added sequentially for convenience so as not to disturb the
numbering of previously adopted rules.
II. GAPS
Gaps are evident from the absence of rules to serve a particular
need. Many times these gaps can be filled by interpolation made in
the context of other rules, but often a judge is without sufficient
guidance to interpolate effectively in the absence of a rule. For
example, how does one stay an order of an agency pending appeal?
The B Rules, which address appeals from the decisions of
administrative agencies, are silent. How does one procure further
discovery from an expert witness when he submits a written report
that may be deficient?' 7 Does Rule 1219 not apply to the District
Court? Maybe it does not.18 There are other examples of similar gaps
in the rules.
III. INHERENT CONFLICTS
Rules changes made for a wide range of subjects over an
extended period of time unwittingly have resulted in inherently
conflicting rules. For example, numerous problems have been
created by the two types of summonses, one issued under the long
arm statute whereby a defendant must respond within a given
number of days after service,' 9 and the other issued for conventional
service which must be answered within fifteen days after a return
generally to the administration of the courts of the State in accordance with the
provisions thereof." See note 18 infra.
16. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
17. The Rule in question is made up of two sentences. The first sentence provides
that the report of an expert expected to testify can be obtained. The second
sentence provides "[ilV such expert has not made a written report" then, and
presumably only then, may his deposition be taken. Md. Rule 400(f) (emphasis
added). This approach to discovery is unduly niggardly.
18. Md. Rule 1(a)(7) provides that Chapter 1200 applies "generally to the
administration of the courts of the State." Md. Rule 1(a)(1) has similar language
but specifically excludes the District Court. Therefore, one would conclude that
Rule 1(a)(7) applies even to the District Court because there is no specific
exclusion in that rule. However, other rules suggest otherwise. Md. Rule 5(i)
defines "court" to include only the circuit courts and not the District Court unless
expressly provided, or unless necessarily inferred. A review of Md. Rule 1210
suggests that only the circuit courts are considered. Thus, does the requirement
of Md. Rule 1219 (Notice of Order) apply to all courts, or only to the circuit
courts?
19. Md. Rule 107(b). See also Md. Rule 106(e)(3) (Corporation's time for pleading after
service); Md. Rule 108(d) (United States' time for pleading after service).
[Vol. 9
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day.20 Service under the long arm statute does not coincide with the
concept of a non est because there are no return days and the writ
remains in force indefinitely. Consequently, Rule 530, which depends
on two non ests, suffers from the conflict.
21
Other more obvious conflicts exist. For instance, Rule 417
dealing with interrogatories requires the propounder to file excep-
tions to the answers within ten days.22 On the other hand, Rule 422
requires him to move to compel further answers, and yet there are no
time limits on the motion to compel. 23 The rules also make
distinctions without a difference among oaths, affirmations, verifica-
tions, and affidavits. 24 Rule S74 requires that testimony in a divorce
proceeding be taken before a master, and only upon court order can
it be taken in court. On the other hand, Rule 581 permits a party to
any equity proceeding to require testimony in open court simply
upon application. 25 Rule 541(a)(1) permits a party in a law
proceeding to dismiss his action without leave of court at any time
before evidence is taken. Parties to an equity proceeding, on the
other hand, need a court order to have an action dismissed.26 While
there may be some justifiable basis for the distinction, it probably
does not survive intense scrutiny. By comparison the federal rules
have worked successfully for years with a consistent rule for both
law and equity.27
IV. AMBIGUITIES
The style of many rules is so imprecise that in many instances
outright ambiguities result. For example, Rule 5(v) defines the term
pleading to mean:
any paper filed in an action, setting forth a cause of action
or ground of defense, or filed with the object of bringing an
action to issue or trial or obtaining any decision or act by
the court including a . . . petition, motion .... 28
It is obvious that under this rule a motion for extension of time is a
"pleading"; a motion for leave to file more than thirty interrogato-
20. Md. Rule 307(a).
21. See, e.g., Md. Rule 530(a)(1) which provides for dismissal for lack of prosecution
within 18 months after the second non est.
22. Md. Rule 417(c)(1).
23. Md. Rule 422(a)(2).
24. Md. Rule 5(c). See text accompanying notes 43-44 infra.
25. Md. Rule S74(a) reads in part: "Such testimony shall be taken before an
examiner unless the court shall direct otherwise." Md. Rule 581 requires that
testimony be taken in court if requested by a party in interest.
26. Compare Md. Rule 541(a) (permitting dismissal in a law matter without a court
order) with Md. Rule 582 (prohibiting voluntary dismissal of equity matter
without the court's permission).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
28. Md. Rule 5(v) (emphasis added).
19791
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ries is a "pleading"; and a request to place a case on the trial docket
is also a "pleading." While this may not shock the conscience, it is
broader than many might consider prudent under the traditional
notions that pleadings only set forth the claims and defenses that
frame the issues for trial. This over-breadth of definition has caused
at least the following serious problem.
Rule 307 requires a defendant to file his initial "pleading" within
fifteen days after the return day to which he is summoned unless the
time is extended or shortened under Rule 309(b) pursuant to a court
order.29 Yet, under Rule 309(a) this time is extended automatically by
filing a "pleading" which requires compliance by a party or
disposition by the court.30 It follows, therefore, that the time for
filing the initial "pleading" may be extended by filing another
"pleading." Obviously the two "pleading" terms are used differently
and are not both used as defined under Rule 5(v). Thus, if the time
for "pleading" is extended by any paper seeking court relief, as
pleading is defined in Rule 5(v), then the time for "pleading" can be
extended indefinitely by filing motions which require action by the
court, even if these motions are not addressed to the merits or issues
of the case.3
More inconsequential weaknesses in style, while not resulting in
ambiguity, certainly create bulk. Rule 320(a), which provides for
amendment, takes one-half of a page to state what could probably be
said more clearly in one sentence. Indeed, the whole rule continues
for four pages; it should be written in a page.32
The rule books presently in use contain annotations to the rules
that are outdated and inapplicable. Nevertheless, courts are
repeatedly cited to the cases annotated in the Rules themselves even
though they are no longer applicable. For example, Rule 419
(discovery of documents) is still annotated by cases requiring the
showing of good cause. However, good cause as a requirement was
abrogated years ago as a prerequisite to the production of docu-
ments13
29. Md. Rule 309(b) provides for extension or shortening of the time allowed for filing
a pleading "for good cause shown."
30. Md. Rule 309(a) extends automatically to fifteen days the time for "pleading"
when the opposing party's "pleading" requires a ruling by the court or
compliance by a party.
31. It is important to note that Md. Rule 610(a)(2) (Motion for summary judgment)
does not by its own terms extend the time for pleading. The consequences of this
are in turn peculiar. Since a demurrer cannot "speak," if one wished to challenge
a pleading by referring to a document outside the declaration, he would be
required to file a motion for summary judgment. But since the motion for
summary judgment does not extend the time for pleading, he would also have to
file a demurrer or pleas or some other "pleading" in addition to the motion in
order to prevent a default.
32. Md. Rule 320.
33. Before the 1973 amendment, the introductory paragraph of Md. Rule 419 read:
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all
other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 406 (Order to Protect Party
[Vol. 9
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V. INEFFICIENCIES
The most clearly defined aspect of inefficiency in the Maryland
Rules is its concept of pleading, which serves as the foundation for
all rules. The Maryland Rules are designed to deal with problems
one at a time and one after the other, so that resolution of one
problem delays consideration of the next. For example, the following
pleading sequence is totally conceivable, each step requiring a
response, briefs, and a hearing before the next step is taken:
1. A motion raising a preliminary objection under Rule 323. 34
2. A demand for particulars under Rule 346.
3 5
3. A Rule 326 motion demanding written instruments.36
4. A demurrer under Rule 345.
5. A dilatory plea with the resulting trial on the issue raised
under Rule 341.
6. A plea on the merits under Rule 342.
7. A demand for particulars to the plea on the merits under Rule
346.3
7
In addition, with the free amendment rule, which requires no leave
of court,38 any one of these steps could be invoked anew. It is
conceivable that the pleading stages of a case could continue for
years before the case is brought to issue. This difficulty is in addition
to the problem created by the definition of the term "pleading"
discussed above.39
VI. REORGANIZATION PROJECT
Despite the energy and diligence of the Rules Committee, these
problems cannot be prevented when amendment continues on a
frequent basis to a body of law as large and involved as the
Maryland Rules. It is apparent that only an entire revision of the
rules for the purpose of making them simpler, more precise, and less
susceptible to change will correct these problems.
and Deponent), the court may, at any time in any proceeding . Since its
amendment in 1973, the introductory paragraph merely states: "Any party may
serve on any other party a request."
34. Md. Rule 323 states ten different defenses in addition to charitable immunity
that constitute grounds for a motion raising preliminary objection.
35. Md. Rule 346 allows a party to "demand in writing, a bill of particulars whenever
a pleading is so general as not to give sufficient notice to him of the claim or
defense asserted by such pleading."
36. Md. Rule 326 provides that when an action or defense is founded on a written
instrument, the opposing party may require that it be filed in the proceedings
and incorporated in the pleading setting forth the claim or defense.
37. Md. Rule 346(a) appears by its terms to permit the disclosure of a defense
incorporated in a general issue plea. "A party may demand, in writing, a bill of
particulars whenever a pleading is so general as not to give sufficient notice to
him of the claim or defense asserted by such pleading." Id. (emphasis added).
38. Md. Rule 320(d)(1).
39. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
1979]
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The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
proposed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland that a complete
reorganization be undertaken, and, after discussing an outline of the
concept with the court, the project has been approved to proceed
under the mandates that the problems be corrected and the bar be
kept informed. 40
Reorganization and rework of the rules is now underway with
numerous subcommittees each concentrating on special areas of the
reconstruction. The subcommittees, in conjunction with experts and
consultants from broad geographical and disciplinary fields, are
addressing the recognized problems and, to be sure, are probably
creating new ones.41 But the effort to date has been gratifying and
will probably be welcomed by both the bench and the bar.
Addressing the organizational problems, the Rules Committee
will propose the adoption of six titles as follows:
Title 1. General Provisions. These rules will be applicable to all
courts and all proceedings.
Title 2. Civil Procedure. These rules will govern the procedure in
all civil courts, including the District Court.
Title 3. Evidence. A special committee on new evidentiary rules
has proposed a draft based on the codification of
Maryland evidentiary decisions and the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Whether this title will be proposed as a part
of the reorganization will be decided at a later time.
Title 4. Criminal Procedure. This title will contain an integra-
tion of the newly rewritten rules of the District Court
and the circuit courts into a single body.
Title 5. Appellate Procedure. These rules will govern the
procedure in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Title 6. Judicial Administration. These rules, as those in Title 1,
will be applicable to all courts and all proceedings and
relate to the supervision of judges, lawyers, clerks,
sheriffs, masters, and other court personnel.
The six titles will be grouped, with indices, in smaller volumes so
that practitioners will have to carry a minimum of bulk to court.
40. The former chairman of the Rules Committee, Judge Kenneth C. Proctor, has
written an article about the reorganization. Proctor, Maryland Rules of Practice
and Procedure Brief History - Pending and Projected Changes, MD. B.J.,
December 1976, at 24. Presentations have been made to the Maryland Board of
Governors, the Maryland State Bar Association, and various bar associations
around the state by members of the Rules Committee. The Maryland State Bar
Association has formed a liaison committee whose members have access to and
who will participate in the dissemination of the reorganization process.
41. See Sykes, Of Men and Laws: Murphy, Confurd, Arnold, Potter, Parkinson,
Peter, MacCoby, and Gall, 38 MD. L. REV. 37, 65-66 (1978), wherein the author
concludes "recodification will necessarily produce new mistakes and ambiguities
all its own" by reason of the GUP (the Generalized Uncertainty Principle) which
tells us: "Any complex system will always have unpredicted side effects." Id. at
53.
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Reorganization within the six titles will be equally dramatic.
Special proceedings, that cannot be justified as "special," will be
incorporated into the general rules of procedure. For example, a
divorce suit is an equity proceeding that applies normal equity
procedure. While the substantive law applied in divorces may be
special, there is no reason why the procedure cannot be the same as
in other equity cases. On the other hand, a foreclosure proceeding,
when pursued under a power of sale or consent to a decree, does not
run the traditional equity course, but is a specialized in rem
proceeding against property. Because its procedures are unique,
foreclosure will remain under the revised rules as a special
proceeding.
Other aspects of the reorganization of the rules will involve the
elimination of duplicative procedure. For instance, procedure in law
and equity will be the same wherever possible. Within the judicial
administration section, all rules dealing with particular categories of
court personnel, including attorneys, will be grouped in one location.
Principal definitions and rules of construction will not be restated
within each of the titles but will be collected in the initial title
relating to general provisions.
Far more important than the physical reorganization of the
rules is the attention that will be given to important concepts in
pleading and discovery. For example, with respect to pleading, a
simple two-step pleading procedure is being considered which is
similar in structure to that used in the federal courts. 42 The
defendant under this procedure will file motions as one step and
answers as the second. In the alternative, the defendant can file an
answer together with the points which otherwise would have been
raised by motion. Perhaps, the current laborious one-step-at-a-time
pleading can be discarded. Obviously many desirable aspects of the
present Maryland Rules ought to be retained, such as the general
issue plea and the specifically enumerated defenses, which should
probably even be expanded.
The style and form of the reworked rules will be noticeably
better. Clarity of both style and concept is being sought. By way of
example consider the present rules that make distinctions in the
definitions of the terms "oath," "affirmation," "verification," and
"affidavit" but nevertheless incorporate one definition into the other.
The present rule reads:
Affidavit - Oath - Verification.
"Affidavit" means an oath that the matters and facts
set forth in the paper writing to which it pertains are true to
the best of the affiant's knowledge, information and belief.
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12-14.
1979]
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An "oath" means a declaration or affirmation made under
penalties of perjury, that a certain statement of fact is true.
An oath may be made before an officer or other person
authorized to administer an oath, or may instead be made
by signing the paper containing the statement required to be
under oath and including therein the following representa-
tion: "I do solemnly declare and affirm under the penalties
of perjury that the contents of the foregoing document are
true and correct." Whenever under these Rules a pleading or
other paper is required to be "verified," this means that an
affidavit must be made thereto.
43
The rule is followed by a committee note that is longer than the
text.44 While the committee note is not considered part of the rule, it
is almost necessary to read it in order to understand the rule or its
application.
As the product of the reorganization effort, a new definition of
"affidavit" will be proposed returning to the essential concepts of the
term. The new definition reads:
Affidavit.
"Affidavit" means a written statement the contents of
which are affirmed under the penalties of perjury to be true.
Unless the applicable rule expressly requires the affidavit to
be made on personal knowledge, the statement may be made
to the best of the affiant's knowledge, information and
belief.
It is hoped that all the proposed rules will be shorter, more precise,
and simpler in concept than the current ones. It is also hoped that
the quality of the reorganization will minimize future changes so
43. Md. Rule 5(c).
44. The Committee note reads:
The verification, before a notary or other officer, of pleadings and other
papers in court actions has become an empty form. Various statutes
have dispensed with this requirement and have permitted a signed
declaration or affirmation under penalties of perjury instead. See Code,
CA, § 1-302 (acknowledgements and verifications required by corpora-
tion statute); ET, § 1-102 (verification required under testamentary
laws); ET, § 13-103 (verification required in proceedings for protection of
minors and disabled persons). This policy is now adopted for all
verification required by the Maryland Rules. The acknowledgment of
conveyances and other documents is unaffected by this change. The
change relates only to the form necessary to constitute verification, and
does not relax specific requirements as to the substance of affidavits,
e.g., Rule 610 b (Summary Judgment - Form of Affidavit - Further
Evidence).
"Oath" as used in the Maryland Rules is a word of art and means
essentially a form of declaration which subjects the affiant or witness to
penalties for any wilful false statement.
[Vol. 9
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that new enactments of the General Assembly will fit within the
structure of existing rules.
The end product will have to be the result of a continuing
dialogue between members of the bar and the bench and among the
various disciplines at the bar. The Maryland State Bar Association
has taken important steps in this direction by establishing a special
standing committee. That committee, working with the Rules
Committee, will design the means by which the rework can be
disseminated on a gradual basis for comment, criticism, and
constructive improvement.
